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THE CLAMOR FOR REGULATORY REFORM
Historically important crises have resulted in regulatory reform.
The Panic of 1907 led to the founding of the Federal Reserve.
The Depression led to the enactment of Glass-Steagall in 1933,
creating the FDIC, and separating commercial from investment
banking.
The Thrift Crisis in the late 1980s led to the enactment of FDICIA
and “prompt corrective action.”
The collapse of Enron and Worldcom led to the enactment of
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REFORM LEGISLATION LIKELY
This look at history tells a clear story:
The current crisis is likely to lead to new, reform-oriented
legislation.
But ...
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ORGANIZING A REFORM AGENDA
We are clearly in the middle of the largest ﬁnancial crisis in a
generation.
First ask: Which aspects of the current regulatory system are
working well?
Learn from these.
Then ask: Which aspects are working poorly?
There are many suspects here!
Then: Design reform based on successful parts of the regulatory
system.
Keep in mind: Where can unintended consequences intrude?
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PLAN FOR THIS TALK
1 The nature of the crisis.
1 A failure of ﬁnancial engineering.
2 “Bank runs” on non-bank ﬁnancial institutions.
2 Parts of the regulatory system work well.
3 Parts of the regulatory system work poorly, especially with
respect to large ﬁnancial institutions.
4 How can we apply the lessons from the parts that work well?
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A FAILURE OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING
Securitization markets are in principle a good ﬁnancial
innovation.
The initial success of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) masked
underlying problems.
By the time of failure, large quantities of MBS and related assets
were held globally.
Few major players escaped unscathed, suggesting few knew the
dangers.
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MORE ON FAILED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING
The resulting shock to the global macroeconomy is large and
real.
There is no escaping the adjustment that must occur.
Government intervention cannot offset this large shock
completely, only mitigate some of the effects.
The design of the securities was the core problem: They did not
perform well in some states of the world.
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“BANK RUNS” ON NON-BANKS
Bank runs have been a macroeconomic hazard for hundreds of
years.
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MORE ON “BANK RUNS”
This crisis has instead produced “runs” on non-bank,
non-depository institutions.
There was no regulation in place for this hazard, because it was
not generally viewed as a hazard.
Bear-Stearns, for instance, borrowed short-term, but against
collateral.
Deposit insurance does not solve this problem.
What to do?
Most reform suggestions do not address this problem either.
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PORTIONS OF THE REGULATORY SYSTEM WORK WELL
Bank regulation outside the largest ﬁnancial institutions has
worked well during the crisis.
We do not see the small bank panic that characterized the
Depression, even though this is a big crisis.
The system of deposit insurance plus prudential regulation
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MORE ON SUCCESSFUL REGULATION
There are bank failures in the system, but they have not caused
market disruption.
Why the success?
The ﬁrst component is good monitoring.
A fairly clear rating system is in place.
The monitoring system means that the regulator is aware of
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MORE ON SUCCESSFUL REGULATION
The second component is a clear and credible resolution regime.
Credibility means that all parties understand what will happen
in the event of bank failure.
The U.S. has a system for closing banks in a way that does not
damage others in the industry.
Conclude: Good regulation is good monitoring plus a clear,
credible resolution regime.
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WHAT THE SUCCESSFUL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE DOES
The system is not designed to “keep banks in business at all
costs.”
Nor is the system designed to tell owners how to run their
business.
The system in fact allows some failure to occur.
What it is designed to do is to turn potentially disorderly failures
into orderly failures.
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LESS-SUCCESSFUL REGULATION
The key problem areas in this crisis have been with large banks
and large non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
These are often global enterprises.
The monitoring problem for these institutions is more difﬁcult.
The bank component of the ﬁrm may be only a smaller piece of a
large conglomerate.
As a result, it was difﬁcult to discern how these ﬁrms were
coping with the ﬁnancial engineering failure.
Firms near failure might alert authorities only days before the
event.
So the ﬁrst part of good regulation was missing: monitoring was
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NO CLEAR RESOLUTION REGIME
In addition, the resolution regime is unclear.
So the second part of good regulation, a clear, credible resolution
regime, was also missing.
These ﬁrms are often considered “too big to fail” because of the
market disruption that might be caused.
The correct phrase is “too big to fail ... quickly.”
No ﬁrm is literally too big to fail.
Regulators may encounter fraud—for instance, as with Enron.
Some plan has to be in place to shut down the failed institution
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DEFINING TOO BIG TO FAIL
What is meant by “too big to fail quickly”?
We want an orderly resolution regime that will close down the
failed ﬁrm without creating problems for the remaining ﬁrms in
the industry.
Ronald Feldman and my colleague Gary Stern emphasize that
this resolution regime must be credible.
Credible means that all parties understand what the regime is
and that it will indeed be employed in the event of failure.
The resolution regime then affects the entire equilibrium pricing
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CORE PROBLEMS
What are the core problems relative to the successful part of the
regulatory structure?
Monitoring of large banks and non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms is
difﬁcult.
This has led to sometimes sudden revelation of problems at
major institutions.
Very disruptive.
Lack of a clear resolution regime has kept all parties guessing
what will happen next.
In the face of the ﬁnancial engineering failure, the Fed has been
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EXISTING RESOLUTION REGIMES
Given the discussion, you may be surprised to learn that the U.S.
actually has a resolution regime for large non-bank ﬁnancial
ﬁrms.
It is called “bankruptcy court.”
It often means reorganization instead of liquidation.
This has been considered inadequate for certain types of large
non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
A simple reform would be to rewrite the bankruptcy code to
allow for special considerations that apply to ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
This would not help us with the monitoring question: the ﬁling
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SIZE LIMITATIONS
One simple approach that has been suggested might be to limit
the size of ﬁrms.
This would bring large ﬁnancial institutions within a regulatory
framework which is robust and is known to work well, even in a
crisis.
Still, it is questionable whether size restrictions could be
adequately enforced.
The global aspect of these ﬁrms might also make this idea
difﬁcult to implement.
A version of this would be to place a tax on ﬁrm size.
A tax does not seem to help either with monitoring or with
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MONITORING WITHOUT A RESOLUTION REGIME
The most common response to the situation has been that we
need more monitoring of large ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
It is unclear what monitoring by itself can accomplish. We need
the resolution regime.
Monitoring can help authorities track which ﬁrms are likely to
fail.
It cannot do very much about poor business decisions.
Regulators are not going to have a better idea than business
leaders themselves as to which direction the ﬁrm should go in
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THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
The Fed is the nation’s lender of last resort.
If the Fed may be lending to institutions, it will need to have a
role in regulating those institutions.
Otherwise, the Fed will be unable to make a judgement on
whether to lend and under what terms.
The role of Fed lending in mitigating the current crisis has been
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THE NATION’S MONETARY AUTHORITY
The Fed also runs the monetary policy of the nation.
To perform this function effectively, the Fed needs to know the
condition of the ﬁnancial system.
This also argues for a substantial Fed role in the regulation of
these ﬁrms.
The need to know the status of ﬁnancial markets has been
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SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION
Should the U.S. have a systemic risk regulator?
Widely discussed in the wake of ﬁnancial market turmoil.
The Fed has been the de facto systemic risk regulator.
Many ﬁnancial market problems, whether under the ofﬁcial Fed
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A POORLY DEFINED DEBATE
The debate on systemic risk regulation needs to be sharpened
substantially.
The deﬁnition of systemic risk regulation is far from clear.
A macro-prudential view: does the Fed already do this?
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A MACRO-PRUDENTIAL VIEW
A macro-prudential view often emphasizes a regulator that
“takes everything into account.”
Coupled with monetary policy, it means taking everything into
account when setting interest rates.
I think the Fed already does this.
Certainly, policy debates in the last twenty years have discussed
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THE FED AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Three important systemic calls by the Fed:
William Poole on GSEs.*
Gary Stern on “Too Big to Fail.”**
Ned Gramlich on subprime.***
*“Financial Stability,” 2002; “Housing in the Macroeconomy,” 2003; and “Reputation and the Non-Prime Mortgage Market,” 2007.
**Gary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
***Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust, Urban Institute Press, 2007.CLAMOR NATURE OF THE CRISIS SMOOTH REGULATION PROBLEM AREAS CURRENT DEBATES THE FED’S ROLE
A NARROWER VIEW
A narrower view would contain the idea that certain market
practices may need to be curtailed.
Alternatively, business practices at certain ﬁrms might need to be
discouraged, should they be viewed as systemically risky.
What is unclear is what powers a new regulator would need to
carry out these tasks.
How would ﬁrms operate, knowing that a particular practice
might be found “too risky” at some point in the future?
I do not think the answers are clear at this point.
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CONCLUSIONS
For smaller banks, the U.S. regulatory system works well and is
robust during a crisis.
That system includes deposit insurance, high-quality monitoring
of banks, and a clear, credible resolution regime.
For large banks and non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms, monitoring is
more difﬁcult and the resolution regime is unclear.
Key improvements would be to develop a credible resolution
regime for large ﬁnancial institutions, and to upgrade
monitoring.
The Fed’s lender of last resort and monetary policy functions
mean that it will have to remain closely involved in the
regulatory structure.
Systemic risk regulation has been widely discussed, but the
debate strikes me as too broad and unfocused at this point.